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This paper gives some insight into the existence of a positive effect of family planning programmes 
on women’s employment in developing countries. We study married women aged 15 to 49 living 
throughout India using a sample drawn from the National Health Family Survey (NFHS-2) for 
1998-1999. We focus on a programme of doorstep services delivered by health or family planning 
(FP)  workers  who  are  sent  to  visit  women  in  their  assigned  areas.  Results  derived  from  the 
estimation  of  fixed  effect  linear  probability  and  conditional  logit  models  show  a  positive  and 
significant correlation of the share of women living in a local area (village, town or city) that has 
been visited by FP workers with the probability of women’s employment. A multinomial analysis 
also shows that the largest positive effect of FP in rural India is to be found on paid work, as 
opposed to unpaid work, suggesting a potential empowering feedback of demographic measures 
through labour earnings. 
 
JEL Classification: J13, J16, J18, J22, O18 
 
Keywords: India, women’s employment, family planning, urban and rural development. 
   
   
* Francesca Francavilla, Policy Studies Institute, University of Westminster, London; F.Francavilla@westminster.ac.uk 
**Corresponding  author:  Gianna  Claudia  Giannelli,  University  of  Florence,  Department  of  Economics,  E-mail: 
giannelli@unifi.it 2 
 
   
Acknowledgements. We presented an earlier version of this paper in June 2008 at the International Association For 
Feminist Economics (IAFFE) and in September 2008 at the European Association of Labour Economists (EALE). We 
are grateful to Tindara Addabbo, Arnab K. Basu, Alessandro Cigno, Maria Laura di Tommaso, Leonardo Grilli and two 
anonymous referees for their useful comments.  
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
  Female participation in  the labour force is considered one of the main  steps towards women’s 
empowerment  in  developing  countries.  Increasingly  over  time,  international  institutions  and 
national governments have taken actions to enlarge women’s participation in the market, as a key 
strategy towards female empowerment, reduction of fertility and mortality, and improvement of 
nutrition  and  welfare.  So  far,  micro  credit  finance  (Pitt  et  al.,  2006)  and  vocational  training 
(Attanasio et al., 2009), in conjunction with childcare support, are among the most effective policy 
instruments used. One example of these initiatives is the Development of Women and Children in 
Rural Areas programme (DWCRA) in India, supporting, among other things, microfinance banking 
for the creation of female self-employment occupations.
1 Other examples are ProJoven in Peru and 
Jóvenes en Acción in Colombia, whose scope was to give young women living in the slums equal 
training opportunities and childcare support.
2  
However, development policies have tended to centre more on women's reproductive rather than 
productive  roles,  as  shown by  the  amount  of  investment  in  population  and  family  planning 
programmes that have far exceeded those in women's productive roles (Mehra, 1997).
3  
In this study we investigate whether health and family planning programmes may also le ad to a 
greater involvement of women in the labour market. Among the scarce scientific evidence on this 
relation, the study by Miller (2010) shows that lowering the cost of contraception in Colombia, as 
                                                 
1 This programme was launched by the Government of India in 1982. It aimed at involving the women in development 
activities by organizing them into groups. Such groups decided on the targets regarding the amount to be saved, the 
rules and regulations regarding loans, and the interest rate charged on the loans. A group which successfully achieved 
its savings target became eligible for the availing of credit from the bank for starting income generation activity. 
2 ProJoven provided vocational training to sixteen-to-twenty-four year olds in ten major cities between 1996 and 2003. 
Jóvenes en Acción, was introduced in Colombia between 2002 and 2005 and provided on -the-job training to young 
people in the two lowest socio-economic strata of the population. Although targeted to young people of both sexes, 
these programmes also aimed at promoting women's equal access in the labour market through training in non -
traditional skills combined with the provision of additional stipends to cover childcare. 
3 In the second half of the 90’s, for instance, expenditures in family planning programmes of the U.S. Agency of the 
International  Development  -  the  main  vehicle  for  the  United  States'  bilateral  foreign  assistance  programs  -  have 
amounted to 440 million dollars as compared with 5 to 10 million dollars for programmes supporting the economic 
function of women in developing countries (Mehra,199, p. 140).   
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part of the Profamilia project,
4 has mainly favoured  first birth postponement and enabled young 
women to work more and live independently later in life. Our argument in this study is that family 
planning programmes may also affect women’s employment in the short-term, notwithstanding the 
fact that women’s fertility decisions may have been affected by the programme.  
These  family  planning  programmes  monitor  various  aspects  of  women’s  and  children’s  health, 
provide information on family planning, and counsel and motivate women to adopt appropriate 
health and family planning practices. In this respect, they also entail an improvement in household 
production  technology  that,  we  argue,  may  give  women  an  opportunity  of  engaging  in  market 
activities – good practices and healthier households imply less time needed for caring.  
  Our focus is on the potential influence that family planning might exert on the employment of 
women in India, a country of long-standing tradition in demographic policies. We concentrate on 
the radical reform of population policies that took place in 1996, the so-called Reproductive and 
Child Health (RCH) programme. With this reform, the Indian government shifted the emphasis 
from  achieving  demographic  targets,  to  meeting  the  reproductive  needs  of  individual  clients 
(Ministry of Health and Family  Welfare, 1996). By the second part of the 1990s,  fertility had 
already declined considerably and the new programme aimed to give women advice on many other 
aspects concerning the daily management of the household. To this end, a programme of doorstep 
delivery  of  services  was  implemented  in  all  States,  and,  since  1998,  the  year  of  actual 
implementation of this policy, health or family planning (FP) workers are sent to regularly visit 
households in their assigned areas.  
  Our hypothesis is that women who live in areas visited by FP workers are exposed - either directly 
if they receive the visit, or indirectly through contacts with neighbours who have received it - to a 
kind  of  informal  education  that  develops  health-caring  habits.  Such  improvement  in  domestic 
                                                 
4Profamilia of Colombia (Asociacion Probienestar de la Familia Colombiana). Profamilia was founded in Bogota´ in 
1965 and became the country’s dominant family planning provider for three decades (see Miller, 2010).  
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technology gives women better control over their time resources and a chance to choose whether to 
work in  the market.  Also,  it is  reasonable to  expect  that the higher the number of households 
visited, the wider the diffusion of FP knowledge in the place where women live. We therefore test 
the  hypothesis  that  the  probability  of  working  might  increase  with  the  share  of  women  of 
reproductive age who have been visited by an FP worker in the village or in the urban area of 
residence. 
We study married women aged 15 to 49 living in all India using a sample drawn from the National 
Health Family Survey (NFHS-2) for 1998-1999. The survey provides detailed information on the 
types of workers who visited the household (public, private or NGO) and on what matters were 
discussed during the visit (health and/or family planning). Public sector workers provided almost all 
home visits and a large majority of women who were visited at home reported that they received 
services predominantly related to health, and only to a lesser extent to fertility control. Following 
this evidence, at variance with the study by Miller (2010) that focuses on contraception and birth 
control, we stress the potential role of the education-to-health component of family planning for the 
reallocation of time from household to market work in the short-term.  
Given the high heterogeneity in the implementation of the programme at a geographical level, we 
include in our model specification, together with a variety of demographic and socio-economic 
variables, district-level fixed effects. Heterogeneity at a lower level (village, city, town), instead, is 
captured by our variable of interest, namely the ratio of women of reproductive age who have been 
visited by an FP worker in the village or in the city/town of residence. 
We estimate linear probability models, conditional logit models and multinomial models for all 
India and, separately, by urban and rural areas of residence. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the NFHS-2 used for the analysis, Section 3 
describes women’s employment in India using NFHS-2 and gives a short account of demographic  
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policies implemented in India. Section 4 presents the empirical model, Section 5 discusses the 
results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION  
The micro data we use are drawn from the National Health Family Survey, 1998-1999 (NFHS-2)
 5.  
This survey is designed to provide state and national estimates of fertility, the practice of family 
planning, infant and child mortality, mother and child health, and the utilization of health services 
provided to mothers and children. In addition, the survey provides indicators of the quality of health 
and family welfare services, women’s reproductive health problems, and domestic violence, and 
includes information on the status of women, their education, work and standard of living. 
The NFHS-2 is a household survey with a sample size of around 92500 households and 90300 ever-
married women in the age group 15–49. The sample covers more than 99 per cent of the population 
of India living in all Indian States. The sample size for each state was drawn separately for urban 
and rural samples in proportion to the size of the urban and rural populations of each state.  
NFHS-2  used  three  types  of  questionnaire:  the  Household  Questionnaire,  the  Woman’s 
Questionnaire, and the Village Questionnaire.  
The  Woman’s  Questionnaire  collected  information  on  the  following  topics:  background 
characteristics, reproductive behaviour and intentions, quality of care, sources of family planning, 
antenatal,  delivery,  postpartum  care,  breastfeeding  and  reproductive  health,  and  knowledge  of 
AIDS. The Woman’s Questionnaire also investigated the status of women in the household, asking 
about their autonomy and the violence perpetrated against them. Questions are also asked about the 
women’s husbands.  
                                                 
5The first survey was conducted in 1992-93, before the introduction of the FP programme we focus on.   
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The Household Questionnaire listed all usual residents in each sample household plus any visitors 
who stayed in the household the night before the interview. For each listed person in the household, 
the survey collected background information and indicators of household wellbeing. In addition, the 
Household Questionnaire included very detailed information on household members’ health.  
The Village Questionnaire, available only for rural areas, collected information from the sarpanch 
(village  head),  other  village  officials,  or  other  knowledgeable  persons  in  the  village  on  the 
availability  of  various  facilities  and  services  in  the  village  (such  as,  for  example,  health  and 
education  facilities).  Our  analysis  is  based  on  the  Woman’s  Questionnaire  supplemented  with 
information at a household level and our sample includes around 85000 married women with and 
without children, since the latter represent a target for an FP visit as potential mothers.
6  
 
3. FEMALE EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA  
3.1 Female employment in India: a way towards women’s empowerment?  
The employment rate of Indian women is low compared to that of other developing and developed 
countries, but shows an increasing trend in recent years. The National Family Health Survey reports 
that the employment rate of ever-married women for India as a whole was 32 per cent in 1992-1993 
and achieved 37 per cent in 1998-1999 (IIPS and ORC Macro, 2000).
7 
Given the huge size of the population and the obvious  different opportunities for work throughout 
the country, it is not surprising that there is an astonishing difference in women’s employment rates 
among Indian states. The highest percentage of women who work is in the North-Eastern States of 
Manipur (70 per cent), Nagaland (64 per cent), and Arunachal Pradesh (60 per cent), whereas the 
lowest is in Punjab (9 per cent) and Haryana (13 per cent). Women’s work participation is also 
                                                 
6The NFHS-2 survey does not include never married single women, but does include the no-longer married group 
formed by widowed, divorced and deserted women. In our analysis we left them out, since this group is traditionally 
worlds apart from the married women’s group. Being no longer married is a negative social stigma in India. In some 
rural areas it is a common situation that if a husband dies his widow is considered of no use in society. 
7 An analysis of women’s employment in India on the same data can also be found in Francavilla and Giannelli, 2010.  
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relatively low (25 per cent or less) in Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh, and 
Kerala. The job participation of women is relatively high in all the Southern States (except Kerala), 
in all the Western States, and in Madhya Pradesh.  
Part  of  the  literature  on  developing  countries  attributes  an  empowering  function  within  the 
household to employment through a higher control over family resources (see e.g. Folbre, 1984; 
Haddad et al., 1997; Basu, 2006).  
NFHS-2 information on the power to control monetary resources can be used to give some insight 
into the hypothesis of the empowering effect of monetary earnings. For married women earning 
cash, around 11 per cent contribute almost none to total family earnings, 47 per cent less than half, 
21 per cent about one half, 7 per cent more than one half and 12 per cent all. Figure 1 shows who 
decides how the wife's earnings will be spent by wife's earnings share of household income. 
If we exclude the case in which the wife’s earnings are so low that the decision on how to spend 
them presumably does not involve a bargaining process between partners (―Almost none‖ in Figure 
1), it turns out that the power to decide autonomously increases with the proportion of a wife’s 
earnings on total earnings. From a wife's earnings share of ―less than half‖ to ―about half‖ the 
wife’s  power  to  decide  autonomously  increases  together  with  that  of  deciding  jointly  with  her 
husband,  while  the  husband’s  power  to  dispose  of  his  wife’s  earnings  declines.  From  a  wife's 







                                                 
8 In the survey, there are other options with very low frequencies: ―Someone decides‖ and ―Jointly with someone else‖.  
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Figure 1.  







Almost none Less than half About half More than half All
Wife decides Husband decides Jointly with husband
  
Source: NFHS-2, 1998-1999 
 
Turning to the description of our sample, Table 1 shows that the probability of employment of 
married women aged 15 to 49 for all India is 33.6 per cent. The probability of employment is lower 
in urban areas (22.3 per cent) compared to rural areas (38.7 per cent), where women mostly work as 
agricultural or self-employed labourers, often being exploited in terms of earnings and working 
times. The higher proportion of women’s participation in rural areas may be ascribed to the fact that 
in  developing  countries  such  as  India,  poverty  forces  women  to  join  the  workforce.  The 
empowering effect of employment, therefore, depends a great deal on the type and the quality of 
work. It is obvious that women who have occasional, seasonal and/or unpaid jobs, or who are 
reduced to slavery in rural plantations, are less likely to be empowered by their work. Agricultural 
workers (including the self-employed) account for about three-quarters of the women who work in 
rural areas. The self-employed in agriculture, who account for about 60 per cent of all agricultural 
workers in rural areas, are mostly farmers. Women who work as farmers in rural areas are often  
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self-employed on their family farm and are subject to the seasonality of their work. In fact, for the 
most part, women self-employed in agriculture are unpaid workers and four in ten are employed 
occasionally or seasonally. Agricultural employees are women employed as agricultural labourers, 
plantation labourers, forestry workers and related workers. Of them, one woman in ten is unpaid 
and more than four women in ten are engaged only for seasonal or occasional work. Table 1 shows 
that 12.6 per cent of our sample works unpaid in all India, a number that rises to 17 per cent in rural 
areas. 
Women in urban areas are involved in more diversified activities: especially skilled and unskilled 
manual work, sales, and domestic activities, but also in more qualified activities such as nursing, 
other medical occupations and teaching, and the percentage of unpaid and occasional workers is 
lower than in the rural areas. One woman in ten is unpaid and two women in ten are engaged only 
for seasonal or occasional work. In our sample, around 3 per cent of women living in urban areas 
work unpaid. 
Since we believe that women’s empowerment is closely related to the earning capacity stemming 
from a paid job, we address this topic by also studying the determinants of the probability of such 
an event as opposed to that of not working or being in unpaid employment. 
Programmes to ease access to employment have been implemented in India since the 1980s
9. Some 
of  these  were  specifically  addressed  to  women  with  th e  aim  of  promoting  stable  and  paid 
occupations. The National Population Policy adopted by the Government of India in 2000 (Ministry 
of  Health  and  Family  Welfare,  2000)  explicitly  recognized  the  importance  of  women’s  paid 
employment in achieving the goal of stabilizing the population and introduced specific measures for 
paid employment and self-employment. Since women’s participation in rural areas is higher, policy 
                                                 
9For a discussion of employment programmes in India see Mahendra (2006).  
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makers  have  traditionally  concentrated  their  intervention  there  with  the  objective  of  improving 
female work conditions.  
 
 
3.2 The Family Planning programme (FP)  
The FP Programme
10 in India has undergone important changes in recent years and particularly 
during the 1990s. At the beginning in 1952, it was primarily a clinic -based family planning 
programme monitoring the family on the basis of family planning targets to achieve a couple’s 
                                                 
10The actual name is ―Family Welfare Programme‖.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of dependent variables for married women aged 15-49 (percentages in parenthesis) 
All India 
Question  No work  Work   




(33.59)   
  No work  Unpaid work  Paid work   






(20.94)   
         
         
Urban India 
  No work  Work     




(22.31)     
  No work  Unpaid work  Paid work   






(19.53)   
         
         
Rural India 
  No work  Work     




(38.66)     
  No work  Unpaid work  Paid work   






(21.57)   
         
         
Data source: NFHS-2, 1998-99. 
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participation rate in the health system of 60 per cent. After the adoption of the ―extension approach‖ 
in 1963 and subsequent integrations with the Mother and Child Health Programme, the activities of 
the programme broadened significantly. In addition to family planning, the programme provided a 
variety of services to mothers and children, including antenatal, delivery, and postnatal care, the 
immunization of children against various vaccine-preventable diseases, and counselling on mother 
and child health problems and nutrition. In the 1970s and 1980s the central administration gave 
local health workers targets for the number of women they were to sterilize each month. This FP 
programme was then accused of using unacceptable methods to induce people to be sterilized and to 
fulfil  administrative  targets  even  after  the  so-called  ―emergency  period‖  imposed  by  President 
Indira Ghandi in 1976-77 (see Saavala, 1999).  
The  International  Conference  on  Population  and  Development  in  1994  in  Cairo  marked  the 
abolition of the target-oriented approach. The programme was  gradually reoriented towards the 
Reproductive and Child Health Programme (RCH-I) that includes instructions relating to sexually 
transmitted diseases and infections of the reproductive tract. After a piloting period in 1995-96, in 
April 1996 the ―target-free‖ approach was implemented throughout the country, reflecting a change 
in what was believed to be the appropriate method to achieve fertility goals. This event signed the 
beginning of a bottom-up approach in which health workers were expected to consult families and 
local communities at the beginning of every year in order to assess their needs and then establish 
the  requirements  for  the  coming  year.  The  transition  to  a  target-free  approach  was  not 
straightforward and the health workers were concerned about how to achieve objectives without 
specific targets.  After two national  workshops  in  August  1996 the requirements  for the  family 
planning  workers  were  readdressed  and  as  result  of  this  process  the  free  target  approach  was 
renamed the Community Needs Assessment approach (CNA).  
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This approach modified the system of monitoring the programme. From then on, a home visit 
programme has been implemented, in which trained FP workers give advice on a series of matters, 
not only concerning reproductive health, but also nutrition, disease prevention, sanitation and child 
care (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 1998).  
Even  if  the  main  objective  of  FP  programmes  was  demographic,  indirect  effects  on  women’s 
economic conditions through maternal and child health improvements may be expected. In this 
paper we are interested in estimating whether the introduction of a monitoring process at the local 
level by the FP worker visits to the households and in the village community centres has affected 
women’s allocation of time. The hypothesis is that the advice provided by the FP worker might 
determine an improvement in domestic technology that gives the woman an opportunity to employ 
her time resources more efficiently (see Appendix A).  
 
3.3 The Community Need Assessment approach and the family planning worker visit 
The start of the RCH-I programme marked the beginning of a new philosophy on the way in which 
the  country  controls  the  population  growth.  The  experience  of  previous  decades  and  the 
international debate led the Government of India to believe that parents will spontaneously keep 
their family small if they were assured about the health, survival and longevity of their children. 
Therefore, the overall strategy of the government was the provision of health care for the mothers 
and young children combined with the promotion of the use of contraceptives and terminal methods 
for the couples desiring them (Indian Department of Family Welfare, Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, Government of India, 1998).  
In this context, Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs) were identified as the key persons on whom the 
outcome of the programme depended. With the new bottom-up approach ANMs were responsible 
for the Sub-centre Action Plan that was designed to provide a basis for determining the service  
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requirements of the population in the local area.
11 The workload for each Public Health Centre 
(PHC) was then established, to be obtained by adding up the workload of the different ANMs under 
the same PHC. ANMs were required to contribute to this process by means of two methods, first 
conducting a household interview (in February/March of each year) to collect relevant information; 
second,  validating the requirement  which  emerged  from  the survey with ang anwadi workers, 
Mahila Swasthya Sangh and Panchayat health committee members in the community and through a 
comparison  of  the  identified  targets  with  both  the   achievements  of  the  previous  year  and 
demographic calculations obtained using pre-established rigid formulas. 
The ANM was expected to be a qualified person who regularly participate d in training for up-
grading of her knowledge and skills. It was also identified as an essential requirement that she had 
fixed days of the week in  the office so that people would know that she  was available and fixed 
days of the week in which she visited villages, as far as possible according to a fixed roster. 
It was also expected that during her household visits she motivated women in receiving ante-natal 
and post natal care and educated them to bring the children for examination and treatment to the 
sub-centre when needed. During the village visits, it was expected that she visited the anganwadis 
to motivate and counsel the community about health care reproductive health and the risk of 
pregnancy. It was also required that she listened to women’s views in the anganwadis and through 
meetings with the Mahila Swasthya Sangh and counselled them on appropriate health care and 
contraception use. It was also expected that she visited as many families as possible in the village 
and motivated people to avail themselves of the health care facilities that she could provide and 
possibly visited schools and undertook health-checks to ensure that children had full immunization 
                                                 
11 Health services in India are organized in a hierarchical structure composed, from the bottom to the top, by Sub-
centre, Public Health Centre, FRUs/Sub District Hospitals, District, with the last level reporting directly to the Director 
Family  Welfare  in  the  State  Government  and  to  the  Department  of  Family  Welfare  Government  of  India.  In  this 
structure the ANMs operate in the Sub-centre and are responsible for the Action Plans of the Sub-centres that have to be 
prepared every year for the financial year in order to assess the needs of the community and set down targets for the 




and  were  referred  to  check-ups  at  PHCs  by  the  medical  officer  if  they  suspected  any  health 
problems. 
From the previous discussion it is evident that targets were established at the local level by the 
ANMs and that a close relationship with the community was considered essential as well as the 
individual visits to women in their households. With this programme, for the first time, the target 
decisions were taken at sub-centre level by the ANMs on the basis of a consultation process with 
the interviewed women and the community. As a consequence of this process, as well as other 
drivers  such  as  different  resource  allocation  across  States,  the  type  of  services  provided  (e.g. 
number of visits in each village, town and city) was highly heterogeneous across States. Figure 2 
accounts for the variability between States, showing that in both rural and urban areas the FP visit 
coverage varies from a minimum of 20 per cent of cities, towns and villages receiving at least one 




Figure 2  
 
Of course, variability between local areas is also observed in the number of FP visits provided at a 
local level. Figure 3 shows, for urban and rural areas separately, the fraction of women who receive 
the visit in each city, town, and village. Local areas are sorted by the fraction level from those with 
no visits in the area to a maximum ratio of 80 per cent in rural areas and 50 per cent in urban areas.  











cities/towns/villages Source: NFHS-2, 1998-99
Fraction of women who receive the visit in each city/town/village























































Fraction of cities/towns/villages with at least one visit 
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In all India, thirteen per cent of women aged 15-49 received at least one visit in the 12 months 
before the interview (indeed, three visits on average) which is an impressive result considering the 
huge Indian population.  
The majority of women are visited by ANM/LHV (65.6 per cent), followed by other public sector 
health workers (7.4 per cent), public health nurses (6.6 per cent), male planning workers (6.1 per 
cent), anganwadi workers (5.2 per cent), doctors (3.24 per cent), and private doctors (2.6 per cent). 
Among the topics discussed with the family planning worker the most frequent are immunization 
(43.1 per cent), treatment of health problems (35.5 per cent), child care (21.3 per cent), family 
planning (15.1 per cent), and disease prevention (13.4). Other topics discussed with a percentage 
lower  than  the  5  per  cent  (excluding  the  generic  categories  of  others)  are:  delivery  care, 
breastfeeding, supplementary feeding, nutrition, post-partum care, sanitation and cleanliness, and 
oral rehydration.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL  
As discussed in the previous sections, while visiting families, FP workers not only give advice on 
fertility, but also on health, nutrition, child care and other related matters. As a result, we argue that 
FP  visits  imply  an  improvement  in  household  domestic  technology  that  gives  women  an 
opportunity to employ their time resources more efficiently. We use an empirical approach to test 
this hypothesis, namely, whether the FP policy gives women, through a better control over time, an 
opportunity to work in the market. Appendix A reports a baseline theoretical model that, in a two-
period framework, describes how domestic technology may change after the FP visits.  
We devise an econometric model reflecting the economic model outlined in  Appendix  A. The 
objective is to test whether the participation decision is significantly correlated with the fraction of 
women receiving FP in the local area (city, town, or village).   
18 
 
Different outcomes are considered. First we estimate the effect of the intensity of FP visits in the 
local area on two mutually exclusive states for the woman: not working and working. Then we 
specify further the woman’s outcomes considering three mutually exclusive states: not working, 
working unpaid and working paid. 
4.1 Econometric models and outcome variables 
The following empirical discrete choice model emerges from a utility maximisation framework 
with fixed effects. Individual i of group k gains utility from choosing state j represented by the 
utility latent indicator:  
ijk jk j ijk ijk x u         
 
i=1,…,N, j=1,…,J, k=1,...K, where N is the total number of individuals in the sample, J is the 
number of states the individual can choose, K is the number of groups (districts), ijk x  is a vector of 
observed explanatory variables describing women’s characteristics which are assumed to determine 
the  women’s  work  decision.  jk    is  the  fixed  effect  of  the  group  (in  our  case  the  district  of 
residence) for choice j. We are interested in deducing what the unknown parameter vectors j  , 
j=1,…,J,  are.  The  utility  indicator  ijk u is  latent,  but  we  observe  the  realisation:  j yik    if 
isk ijk u u    j s   , i.e. we observe the individual i in state j if she derives the greatest utility from this 
state. 
We first specify two outcome variables of female employment (j=work, no work), and estimate (i) a 
linear  probability  model  with  fixed  effects
12  and (ii) a Conditional Maximum Likelihood logit 
model with fixed effects (Chamberlain, 1980). 
In case (ii) the logit model amounts to estimating the parameters of: 
                                                 
12 This is equivalent to introducing district dummies in the linear regression.  
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Maximizing the likelihood conditioning on the sufficient statistic for  k  , that is, i ik y , yields 
consistent estimators for the  ’s. 
We then specify a multinomial logit with three states, j=0,1,2 ( no work, unpaid work, paid work 
respectively). In this case we introduce the district dummies to estimate the  jk  directly into the 
model, without conditioning the maximum likelihood.
13 
. 
                                                 
13  The  conditional  multinomial  logit  model  has  not  been  implemented  in  any  of  the  available  econometric 
software.However, for a large number of observations in each group (i.e. districts) the bias of the unconditional fixed-
effects estimator is not a concern, and we can confidently use the multinomial logistic regression with an indicator 
variable for each group.  
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4.2 Constructing the FP indicator 
Information on FP is drawn from the Woman’s Questionnaire. The survey contains information on 
several  FP  services  provided  by  public  and  private  health  centres.  Most  of  this  information, 
however, is demand-driven, like, for example, the number of times a woman went to the hospital 
for FP advice. We do not use these indicators, since they would be endogenous to women’s choices.  
A possible indicator of FP exposure is whether the interviewed woman was visited by an FP worker 
in the previous twelve months. While this indicator would be less endogenous than that of the 
woman  visiting  the  FP  centre,  it  could  still  suffer  from  the  problems  of  selection.  To  better 
understand whether the women who were visited are in other ways different from those who were 
not, we have estimated the probability of receiving at least one visit in the previous year controlling 
for women’s, partners’  and household’s characteristics and including  district fixed effects.  The 
results show that, for instance, women who are more educated and with more educated partners are 
more likely to receive the visit. Not surprisingly the presence of own children aged 0-5 is positively 
correlated with the probability of receiving the visit, both in rural and urban areas, but in rural areas 
the probability of receiving the visit is also positively correlated with the presence of small children 
of other women. Religion and caste seem to matter, since women in Scheduled Castes are more 
likely to receive the visit and Christian women in urban areas less likely to receive it. Unfortunately 
the  complexity  of  the  programme  and  the  limited  information  on  its  implementation  at  the 
village/district level do not allow us to identify exactly how women are targeted for the visits. The 
results of our analysis seem to confirm the descriptive information reported in the documentation 
provided by the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The programme, in fact, specifically 
targeted  families  with  young  children  and  aimed  at  improving  the  outreach  of  services  for 
vulnerable groups of the population, namely people leaving in urban slums and tribal populations  
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(Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 1997). At the same time, the analysis reveals a potential 
problem of self-selection since more educated women are more likely to receive the visit. 
Moreover, as discussed in subsection 3.3, with the new bottom-up approach introduced with the 
CNA the ANMs were responsible for the Action Plan for the Sub-centres at the lowest geographical 
level, this implying that targets could be very different across geographical areas. This is confirmed 
by the high heterogeneity in the visits provided at different geographical levels (see Figure 2 and 
Figure 3). In addition, there might be a diffusion of FP advice to neighbouring women who have not 
received the visit. The more the women were visited, the more intense would be this neighborhood 
effect.  This  implies  that  an  indicator  of  whether  the  woman  receives  the  FP  visit  would  be 
insufficient to capture the women’s exposure to the FP programme.  
To  take  into  account  all  these  aspects,  we  opted  for  a  variable  measuring  the  intensity  of  the 
exposure to the programme computed at village (or town or city) level. This is given by the share of 
married women aged 15-49 who receive the visit on the total number of married women in the same 
age group who live in the same village (or town or city). 
Descriptive statistics of this variable (see Appendix B) show that the average share of beneficiaries 
at local level (there are around 3100 villages/towns or cities) is 11 per cent, 9 and 12 per cent 
distinguishing by urban and rural areas respectively. A distribution by local areas shows that around 
one third does not receive this FP service, one half has at most 5 per cent coverage and that in the 
top decile are local areas that have a coverage ranging from 30 per cent to total coverage. 
   
4.3 Control variables 
Control  variables  included  in  the  empirical  analysis  are  classified  in  four  groups:  women's 
characteristics, partners' characteristics, household characteristics, and geographical areas.   
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The first group of variables includes age, education, religion, caste and tribe. Age is a standard 
variable  used  in  empirical  studies  on  employment  to  control  for  the  different  participation  of 
women in different life periods. In this study it is also important for an additional reason, since 
women at different ages may be differently exposed to an FP visit. As far as education is concerned, 
a huge amount of evidence documents the fundamental role of education for development. Various 
studies have shown the positive effect of maternal education on child health and survival (among 
these,  Dreze  and  Murthi,  2001).  Analyzing  the  data  of  NFHS-1,  1992-93,  Govindasamy  and 
Ramesh (1997) found that a mother’s education continues to be a powerful, positive and significant 
predictor of the utilization of child health care services in India, even after controlling for a number 
of other demographic, socioeconomic and spatial variables. Mothers’ education is also found to 
reduce the gender discriminatory practices among mothers of children seeking medical treatment 
during the post-neonatal and later childhood period (Ghosh, 2004, on NFHS-2). Other studies have 
stressed  the  important  roles  of  mothers’  education  in  Asian  societies,  such  as  improving  their 
children’s welfare and education (Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashishtha, 1999). Several 
studies failed to find evidence of a positive link between women's education and female autonomy, 
casting doubt on one of the major pathways through which the former was supposed to reduce 
fertility (see, for example, Jeffery and Basu, 1996; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1996). However, Dreze and 
Murthi (2001), find strong empirical support for the negative association between education and 
fertility in India. 
Any  study  on  India  has  to  include  controls  for  the  households'  caste  or  tribe.
  14  Low-caste 
households and tribal minorities suffer disproportionately from poverty and discrimination, even if 
                                                 
14 The caste system is an expression of the Hindu religion embraced by 80 per cent of the population.  Moreover, the 
country has a huge tribal population that is mainly concentrated in rural and forested areas . Around 50 million people 
are organised in tribal communities.  
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after independence the untouchables have been abolished as a caste by the constitution with norms 
that protect Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST).
15  
However, Kijima’s study (2006) shows that SC and ST are much poorer than non-SC/ST, and this 
is partly due to geographical differences (especially for ST that live in the most unreachable areas of 
the country) and partly to the fact that they are still disadvantaged in obtaining well-paid jobs.
16 
Among partners’ characteristics, occupational position approximates family earnings, a variable not 
available  in  the  survey,  which  should  capture  the  effect  of  non-labour  income  on  women’s 
employment decisions.  
Household’s  characteristics  include  variables  on  the  household  head  (age  and  gender)  and  on 
household size and a range of variables on the number of children in the household, divided by sons 
and daughters of the observed woman and other children in the household, grouped according to 
their age. As is well known in the literature, the presence of children in the household can affect 
mothers’  time  allocation  and  their  work  preferences.  Moreover,  in  developing  countries  where 
enlarged families are quite common, it is also important to control for the presence of children who 
are not the own children of the observed mother, since they might represent a potential increase in 
child care tasks for all members (especially female) in the household.  
The group of household characteristics also includes the wealth index to control for household 
economic condition. The wealth index takes into account almost all household assets and utility 
services and does not produce results that are comparable to either an income or expenditure-based 
                                                 
15 SC and ST, previously called the "depressed classes" by the British are population groupings that are explicitly 
recognized by the Constitution of India. 
16 Bhaumik and Chakrabarty (2010), for example, show that between 1987 and 1999 positive earning differentials 
between ―upper‖ castes and SC/ST have declined, while they have increased between non-Muslims and Muslims. They 
also show that inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings can be explained to a great extent by differences in 
educational capital and returns on work experience. Other studies focus on the reasons why the incidence of poverty in 
SC and ST households is significantly higher than among non-scheduled households (see for example Gang, Sen and Su 




17 All these variables help to control for the heterogeneity of households where th e decision 
whether to participate in the labour market is taken. District fixed effects are included among the 
control variables to control for heterogeneity in both the female employment and the intensity of 
family planning programme at a geographical level. 
 
5. RESULTS 
We  estimate  women’s  employment  probability  using  a  Linear  Probability  Model  (LPM)  and  a 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood logistic model (CML, see Chamberlain, 1980) for all States of 
India and distinguishing between urban and rural India. We then estimate a Multinomial Logistic 
Model  (MLM)  introducing  a  further  distinction  between  working  paid  (in  cash  or  kind)  and 
working unpaid, since women in the latter state are quite a relevant number, as the descriptive 
analysis has shown. In order to absorb as much unobserved heterogeneity as possible in both female 
employment and the intensity of the FP programme, the LPM, the CML and the MLM include fixed 
effects at the district level. Results of this analysis are shown and discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
5.1 The employment probability and FP 
Table  2  reports  the  coefficients  for  the  LPM  and  the  marginal  effects  for  the  CML  of  the 
determinants of the probability of working of married women aged 15-49 in all Indian States, and in 
rural and urban areas respectively. We are interested in understanding whether, controlling for all 
the relevant covariates and for district fixed effects, the share of married women who received at 
                                                 
17The wealth index is a composite measure of the cumulative living standard of a household. It is calculated using data 
on a household’s ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing construction, 
and types of water access and sanitation facilities. The principal components analysis is used to assign the indicator 
weights. This procedure first standardizes the indicator variables (calculating z-scores) and then calculates the factor 
coefficient scores (factor loadings). Finally, for each household, the indicator values are multiplied by the loadings and 
added to produce the household’s index value. In this process, only the first of the factors produced is used to represent 
the wealth index. The resulting sum is itself a standardized score with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001).  
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least one FP visit in a local area - namely village, or town or city - is correlated with the probability 
of working of married women.  
The coefficient of the proportion of women receiving the visit in the village is highly significant for 
all India both with the LPM and the CML, indicating that an increase of one percentage point in the 
share of beneficiaries is correlated with an increase in the probability of working of 0.15 with LPM 
and 0.08 with CML percentage points in the probability of being currently employed. The separate 
analysis for urban and rural areas reveals that the marginal effect is significant for rural India only. 
This might be interpreted by the fact that in urban areas, that typically are in a more advanced stage 
of  development,  the  FP  programme  does  not  produce  such  relevant  changes  in  household 
technology as in rural areas. There might also be a statistical reason for this result, namely, that 





Probability of working of Indian women aged 15- 49. Coefficients of LPM and marginal effects of CML, district fixed effects
Coef. Coef. Coef. Mfx Mfx. Mfx.
Share of beneficiaries of FP
§ 0.15 *** 0.07 0.06 ** 0.08 *** 0.03 0.04 **
          Woman's characteristics
Muslim  -0.09 *** -0.06 *** -0.10 *** -0.09 *** -0.03 ** -0.09 ***
Christian 0.05 *** 0.08 *** 0.04 ** 0.03 *** 0.02 ** 0.03 **
Scheduled caste 0.04 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.04 ***
Scheduled tribe 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.09 *** 0.06 *** 0.02 * 0.05 ***
Woman's age 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 ** 0.01 ***
Woman's age square 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Woman's years of education -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.01 ** -0.02 ***
Woman's yrs of edu. squared 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ** 0.00 ***
               Partner's characteristics
Partner's age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Partner's age square 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 *
Partner's years of education -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 ** -0.01 ***
Partner's years of edu. Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Professional -0.03 ** -0.05 *** -0.03 ** -0.03 * -0.02 * -0.03
Salesman -0.06 *** -0.09 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.04 ** -0.05 **
Self-employed in agriculture 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Skilled blue collar -0.06 *** -0.08 *** -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 *
Unskilled blue collar -0.04 *** -0.04 ** -0.03 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 * -0.02
Other employment  -0.07 *** -0.09 ** -0.05 ** -0.06 ** -0.04 ** -0.04
Household composition
The household head is woman 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.06 *** 0.02 ** 0.05 ***
Age of the household head 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 ***
Household size 0.00 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00
Own children aged 0-2 -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 ** -0.04 ***
Own children aged 3-5 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 * 0.00 0.00
Own children aged 6-14 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 * 0.01 **
Own children aged 15-17 0.01 * 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 * 0.00 0.01
Other children in the hh. aged 0-2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other children in the hh. aged 3-5 0.01 0.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.01 ** 0.00
Other children in the hh. aged 6-14 0.01 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00
Other children in the hh. aged 15-17 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wealth index -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.03 ** -0.06 ***
Urban/Rural area of residence
Urban areas -0.04 *** - - -0.03 ** - -
Constant 0.04 -0.10 0.05 - - -
Sigma_u 0.18 0.13 0.22
Sigma_e 0.40 0.38 0.42
rho 0.17 0.11 0.22
R2 (between and within) 0.15 0.13 0.16
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.11 0.10
Number of observations 82240 25534 56706 78868 25303 56510
Number of districts 440 333 426 440 333 426
Notes.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors. Adjustement clustered by state.
§: Number of women who received at least one FP visit over the total number of women aged 15-49 living in the village/town/city.
Mfx stands for Average Marginal Effects. 
As to dummy variables, the marginal effects are for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
Data source: NFHS-2, 1998-99.
Linear Probability Model  Conditional Logistic Model
All India Urban Rural All India Urban
Differences in the number of observations in the two models are due to some districts predicting failure perfectly. Observations for All India in the 





Some results concerning the other control variables are worth commenting on.  
As to the effects of religion we find that, with respect to Hindu, Muslim women have a lower 
probability  of  working,  whereas  Christian  women  have  a  higher  one.  This  estimate  is  highly 
statistically significant in India as a whole as well as in rural and urban areas with both models. 
Women in scheduled caste and scheduled tribes have a higher probability of working in rural areas 
while the coefficient for scheduled tribe is also positive and statistically significant in urban areas. 
These results are in line with the evidence emerging from other studies. Deshpande (2007) shows 
that, over the period of the liberalization of the Indian economy, there has been a decline in the 
proportion of women belonging to SC and ST who declare they are not working. The same trend is 
not clearly visible for the other castes. 
The effect of the number of a woman’s small children is negative, but only for children up to the 
age of two. The negative effect of small children is relatively small (ranging from 5 to 2 percentage 
points) as compared to that emerging for developed countries. 
The result that children from 3 to 5 do not impede women’s work could be explained by the fact 
that more than two-thirds of residents live in villages that have an anganwadi (a nursery school for 
children of that age). The positive effect of older children may have the interpretation that they can 
contribute  substantially  to  household  work.  Children  of  other  cohabiting  mothers  have  no 
significant influence except for a positive effect of children aged 3-14 in urban areas. 
A husband’s professional position should capture the income effect. In fact, all types of husband’s 
employment positions reduce a woman’s probability of working, except that of a self-employed 
husband in agriculture, with the obvious implication that wives are involved in the family farm 
activity.   
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The coefficient of the wealth index is negative, large and highly significant, thus suggesting that in 
wealthier Indian households women tend to stay at home. 
As to the role of education, we test for a non-linear correlation between years of education and 
female employment and find that education has a significant quadratic coefficient. The linear and 
quadratic coefficients are both highly statistically significant in all estimated models. On the same 
survey data, Mahendra (2004), who analyses the association between female work participation and 
the level of schooling using the household sample of the NFHS-2, finds a negative relation with 
schooling  in  rural  areas,  and  a  positive,  but  much  less  significant,  association  in  urban  areas. 
However, his sample is a larger sample than ours (our sample is composed of married women aged 
15-49, therefore less numerous), including all women (married and unmarried, with children and 
without) aged 15-59. 
 
5.2 The probability of paid employment and FP 
 
As for the estimation procedure of the MLM, we have directly introduced the district dummies 
(around 440)  in  the model.  Given the high number of observations  for each  group (district)  – 
minimum 16 maximum 2200 - the asymptotic properties of the estimated parameters should be 
fulfilled (see Chamberlain, 1980). 
We distinguish, among working women, those paid in cash or in kind, from those unpaid, since the 
latter are quite a  relevant  number, as  the descriptive analysis  has  shown. The marginal effects 
derived from this MLM (see Table 3) show that the most significant effect of the intensity of FP 
visits in the local area is to be found on the probability of ―working paid‖, namely, the percentage 
of beneficiaries in the local area is positively correlated with the probability of working paid. In 
fact, an increase of one percentage point in the share of beneficiaries is correlated with an increase  
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in  the  probability  of  working  paid  of  0.08  percentage  points  for  all  India.  Again,  this  is  only 
significant for rural India, where an increase of one percentage point in the share of beneficiaries is 




Probability of not working, working unpaid or working paid of Indian women aged 15- 49. Marginal effects of MLM, district fixed effects
Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx Mfx
Share of beneficiaries of FP
§ -0.10 *** 0.02 0.08 *** -0.09 0.04 * 0.04 -0.06 *** 0.02 0.04 ***
          Woman's characteristics
Muslim  0.09 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 ** 0.06 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.10 *** -0.07 *** -0.03 *
Christian -0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** -0.06 *** 0.00 0.06 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.03 *
Scheduled caste -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 0.07 *** -0.01 -0.01 ** 0.02 * -0.05 *** -0.05 *** 0.09 ***
Scheduled tribe -0.08 *** 0.01 0.06 *** -0.06 *** 0.00 0.06 *** -0.08 *** 0.02 * 0.06 ***
Woman's age -0.02 *** 0.00 *** 0.02 *** -0.03 *** 0.00 0.03 ** -0.02 *** 0.01 ** 0.01 ***
Woman's age square 0.00 *** 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 * 0.00 ***
Woman's years of education 0.03 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.00 * -0.02 ***
Woman's yrs of edu. squared 0.00 *** 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
               Partner's characteristics
Partner's age 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Partner's age square 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
Partner's years of education 0.01 *** 0.00 *** -0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** -0.01 ***
Partner's years of edu. Squared 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Professional 0.03 * 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 -0.04 *** 0.03 * 0.02 * -0.05 ***
Salesman 0.06 *** 0.03 *** -0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.02 ** -0.11 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 *** -0.09 ***
Self-employed in agriculture -0.01 0.07 *** -0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** -0.07 *** -0.02 0.09 * -0.07 ***
Skilled blue collar 0.05 *** 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.00 -0.07 *** 0.04 0.00 -0.04 ***
Unskilled blue collar 0.04 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** 0.04 ** 0.00 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.01
Other employment  0.06 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.08 *** -0.01 -0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 ** -0.08 ***
Household characteristics
The household head is woman -0.09 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** -0.07 *** 0.01 0.06 ** -0.09 *** 0.06 * 0.04 **
Age of the household head 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Household size 0.01 *** 0.01 *** -0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.01 *** -0.01 ***
Own children aged 0-2 0.05 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 *** -0.04 *** 0.05 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 ***
Own children aged 3-5 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 ***
Own children aged 6-14 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** -0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 ***
Own children aged 15-17 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** -0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 ** -0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 ***
Other children in the hh.  aged 0-2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 *
Other children in the hh. aged 3-5 0.00 0.00 0.01 *** -0.02 ** 0.00 ** 0.02 * 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.01 **
Other children in the hh. aged 6-14 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.01 *** -0.01 ** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.01 *
Other children in the hh. aged 15-17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wealth index 0.08 *** -0.02 *** -0.06 *** 0.07 *** 0.00 * -0.07 *** 0.08 *** -0.02 *** -0.06 ***
Urban/Rural area of residence





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors. Adjustement clustered by state.
§: Number of women who received at least one FP visit over the total number of women aged 15-49 living in the village/town/city.
Mfx stands for Average Marginal Effects. 
For dummy variables the marginal effects are for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
Data source: NFHS-2, 1998-99.
56698
440 333 426





All India Urban Rural
Not working Working unpaid Working paid Not working Working unpaid Working paid
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As for the effects of religion we find that, with respect to Hindu, Muslim women have a higher 
probability of not working and a lower probability of working paid  and unpaid. The effect on 
Christian compared to Hindu is different, they show a lower probability of being not working and a 
higher probability of working paid. Results for religion are strongly statistically significant both in 
urban and rural areas.  
Women in SC and ST have a much higher probability of working paid both in rural and urban areas, 
SC, moreover, seem also to reduce the probability of unpaid work favour paid work both in urban 
and rural areas, even if the effect in rural areas is higher and more statistically significant. As to the 
role of education, the linear marginal effects are highly statistically significant for not working and 
working paid, the quadratic term is also statistically significant but very low.  
The effect of the number of woman’s small children on working is confirmed negative, with small 
children  reducing  both  the  likelihood  of  the  mother  working  paid  and  unpaid.  This  result  is 
observed for rural, urban areas and India as a whole. The results also confirm a positive effect of 
children aged over 3 years on their mothers' employment and, interestingly, the positive effect is 
found only on paid employment, both in rural and urban areas.  
As noted before, the husband’s professional position should capture the income effect. In urban 
areas  all  types  of  husband’s  occupation  reduce  a  woman’s  probability  of  working  paid,  but  a 
husband working in the agricultural sector or as salesman also increases the probability of working 
unpaid. Results are slightly different in rural areas where a husband working in agriculture will 
reduce both the likelihood of no working and working paid in favour of working unpaid. All the 
other husband's occupations have the expected sign, the income effect reducing the likelihood of 
working paid. Interestingly, excluding women married to skilled blue collar workers, all the other 
husband's professions also have a positive effect on unpaid work, suggesting that women, when 
possible, help their husbands as unpaid workers.   
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The coefficient of the wealth index is again large and highly significant indicating that in wealthier 
Indian households women tend to stay at home not working either as paid or unpaid workers. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis has shown that demographic and health policies in India may have a relation with 
female employment. Our argument is that these policies improve the efficiency of domestic and 
care work, thus giving women a chance to choose whether to participate in the labour force. Our 
econometric evidence for India does not reject this hypothesis, showing a positive correlation of a 
particular demographic programme – family planning worker visits to women aged 15 to 49 – with 
the probability of women finding employment. This correlation is highly significant for all India. 
Distinguishing by urban/rural  areas  this  relation  remains  significant  only  for rural  India. There 
might be an economic interpretation of this result, namely, that in urban areas the technological 
improvement in household production implied by family planning may have already exhausted its 
effects. There might also be a statistical interpretation, namely, that some significance is lost when 
splitting the sample. 
Our results also show that the largest positive effect of FP in rural India is to be found on paid work, 
as opposed to unpaid work, suggesting a potential empowering feedback of demographic measures 
through  labour  earnings.  These  results  are  robust  in  all  estimated  models,  also  controlling  for 
district fixed effects. 
Given the remarkable amount of investment in family planning that governments and international 
institutions make in developing countries, it would be relevant to investigate if there is a causal 
nexus between family planning and women’s employment. This would help in finding the optimal 
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Appendix A.  A baseline theoretical model 
In our household model with home production, decision-making is in the hands of the partners. In 
line  with  the  ―collective  approach‖  (see,  for  example,  Bourguignon  and  Chiappori,  1992),  the 
partners have two distinct utility functions, Ui(.), with i=1,2, that they maximize as a weighted 
average with weights representing the balance of power in the household. We assume that men 
always work in the market
18, the partners consume a bundle of domestic (X d) and market (Xm) 
goods, and the woman has to distribute her working time between hours of domestic activities, Hd, 
market work, Hm, and leisure, L. We identify domestic work with time spent providing food and 
preparing meals, preventing and curing diseases of all the family members, and time spent looking 
after children.  
The woman (1) and the man (2) value the two goods in the same way, but the woman also has her 
leisure L in her utility function. The man’s leisure is assumed to be zero. The husband is only 
indirectly interested in his wife’s time, since the household needs to consume at least a minimum 
level  of  domestic  goods,  which  he  is  not  able  to  produce  himself  being  specialized  in  market 
labour.
19  
Under these hypotheses the household utility to be maximized is simply: 
Max U= U1(X,L)+ (1- )U2(X)      (1) 
where 0<<1 is a c oef fic ie nt that is positivel y  r elate d to the powe r  of the  wif e.   
To  be g in  with,  ima g ine  a  situation  of  unde rde v e lopment  whe re  women  are   for c ed  to  allocate  all 
their  time  to  domestic   wor k.  To   g ive  an  ex am ple,  suppose  that   a   cou ple  is  not  abl e  to  contr o l  
fe rtilit y ,  that  the  h ealth  of  the  household  membe rs  i s  continuousl y   at  risk,  that  wa ter   and  food  i s 
difficult  to  provide  and   to  tra nsfor m  into  sa fe   drinks  and  mea ls.  I n  su m,  domestic  production 
                                                 
18 In our sample, 97 per cent of husbands work. 
19 Alternatively, it can be assumed that L directly enters the husband’s utility function, as in Basu (2006), if he draws 
utility from his wife’s leisure.  
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technology is very poor. As a result, the woman will be overburdened by domestic tasks, and all her 
time will be barely sufficient to provide her family and herself with the means to survive. The man 
gives the household a labour income Y, used to buy market goods. Note that Y may also include 
public subsidies deriving from GP. We call this period 1.  
Period 1: no choice 
In period 1 a woman in the household has no choice over the way she can use her time. She has to 
produce a given minimum amount of domestic goods, Xd,min, for her own and her family’s survival. 
This activity will take all her time T, she will have no alternative, and her power will be null, that is 
 =0. Hence, in the beginning the household preference coincides with the husband’s preference. If 
Xd = f(Hd) is the domestic production function, we assume that at time 1 the wife will have to 
produce survival Xd,min=f(T). The household will also consume some market goods, that is Xm =Y.  
Suppose the government decides to intervene to improve a household’s welfare with an FP policy 
that sends FP workers to visit families and give them advice on health, fertility, child care and other 
related matters. This implies a sudden improvement in domestic technology that gives the woman 
an opportunity to employ her time resources more efficiently, and, consequently, a certain degree of 
control over them. We call this period 2.  
Period 2: the participation decision 
At time 2, after this exogenous shock, the domestic production function becomes Xd = g(Hd) with 
g’(Hd)>f’(Hd) for all Hd. At this point, since now producing at least the survival Xd,min no longer 
involves all her time, the woman acquires some degree of freedom over her time allocation, that is 
  >0 if H d,min< Hd<T. 
The utility maximization (1) is now subject to the new domestic production function constraint: 
Xd = g(Hd) ; g’>0 ; g’’<0 ; g’(Hd)> f’(Hd) for all Hd ; Xd,min =f(T)= g(Hd,min);  (2) 
the consumption constraint  
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X= Xd+ Xm;          (3) 
the time constraint 
T= Hd+ Hm+L;  Hd,min< Hd<T;      (4) 
and the budget constraint 
Xm=WHm+Y;         (5) 
where Hm is hours of the woman’s market work and W is the real hourly female wage prevailing on 
the market. 
Depending on the woman’s preferences and the market wage, two situations may occur. In one 
situation the woman maximizes her utility by specializing in domestic work (Hm=0). This is a case 
of no participation, according to which utility maximization occurs at the reservation wage WR= 
g’(Hd)>W.  In  the  other  situation,  for  a  given  wage,  the  woman’s  preferences  are  such  that  it 
becomes convenient to enter the labour market. She will decide to participate and contribute to 















        (7) 
where (6) corresponds to Pareto efficiency in the consumption allocation. From (6) and (7) the 
equilibrium condition of equality of the marginal product of household production and the wage 
rate is derived. Supposing the price of Xm equals unity, then in monetary terms (6) and (7) yield  
) (
'
D H g w   , that is, in equilibrium, the revenue of an extra hour of domestic work must equal its 
marginal cost.   
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Appendix  B.  Descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample  of  married  women 
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Share of beneficiaries of FP* 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.15
          Woman's characteristics
Muslim
§ 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31
Christian
§ 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Scheduled caste
§§
0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39
Scheduled tribe
§§
0.12 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.35
Woman's age 31.03 8.63 32.26 8.31 30.48 8.72
Woman's yrs of edu. 3.99 4.76 6.82 5.26 2.71 3.90
               Partner's characteristics
Partner's age 36.97 9.82 38.03 9.37 36.50 9.97
Partner's yrs of edu. 6.58 5.08 9.02 4.93 5.48 4.75
Partner's yrs of edu. sq. 69.06 75.32 105.72 86.81 52.60 62.95
Professional 0.13 0.34 0.25 0.43 0.08 0.28
Salesman 0.11 0.31 0.20 0.40 0.07 0.26
Self-employed in agriculture 0.36 0.48 0.05 0.23 0.50 0.50
Skilled blue collar 0.22 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.38
Unskilled blue collar 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30
Other employment  0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20
Household characteristics
The household head is woman 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.14
Age of the household head 45.52 13.54 45.61 12.92 45.49 13.80
Household size 6.82 3.63 6.39 3.38 7.02 3.72
Own children aged 0-2 0.36 0.55 0.31 0.53 0.38 0.56
Own children aged 3-5 0.38 0.59 0.32 0.55 0.41 0.61
Own children aged 6-14 1.05 1.21 0.97 1.15 1.09 1.24
Own children aged 15-17 0.25 0.50 0.26 0.53 0.24 0.49
Other children in the hh.  aged 0-2 0.19 0.51 0.14 0.45 0.21 0.54
Other children in the hh. aged 3-5 0.16 0.50 0.12 0.43 0.18 0.53
Other children in the hh. aged 6-14 0.39 0.99 0.30 0.87 0.43 1.03
Other children in the hh. aged 15-17 0.17 0.47 0.13 0.41 0.19 0.49
Wealth index
§§§ 0.02 1.00 0.90 0.91 -0.38 0.75
Geographic area
Urban areas (base: Rural areas) 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Data source: NFHS-2, 1998-99
Notes
*: Number of women who received at least one FP visit over the total number of women aged 15-49 living in the village/town/city.
All India  Urban Rural
§: The base categories are Hindu and all other religions. §§: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes are disadvantaged 
groups of the population who are recognised by the Constitution of India. The base categories are: other backward class, 
other. §§§ The wealth index is a composite measure of the cumulative living standard of a household. It is calculated 
using data on a household’s ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing 
construction, and types of water access and sanitation facilities. The principal components analysis is used to assign the 
indicator weights. This procedure first standardizes the indicator variables (calculating z-scores) and then calculates the 
factor  coefficient  scores  (factor  loadings).  Finally,  for  each  household,  the  indicator  values  are  multiplied  by  the 
loadings and added to produce the household’s index value. In this process, only the first of the factors produced is used 
to represent the wealth index. The resulting sum is itself a standardized score with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). 